To date, there is mixed evidence on the implications of tax avoidance on firm value as measured by Tobin's q or stock price reactions. The take-away from prior literature is that increased opportunities for rent extraction associated with tax avoidance (e.g., in low governance firms), might negatively affect the after-tax value of the firm. We revisit this topic by investigating the association between tax avoidance and firm fundamentals (leverage, profitability, and asset utilization), using DuPont analysis. We document that tax avoidance unambiguously lowers future pretax accounting rates of return (i.e., return on equity, return on net operating assets, and return on operating assets), largely due to inefficient utilization of operating assets and operating liabilities. These results also hold in different contexts that mitigate rent extraction, including when firms have foreign operations and good governance.
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Measures of Future Performance

INTRODUCTION
Despite the significant tax savings generated by tax avoidance activities (e.g., Wilson [2009] ; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt [2013] ), there is mixed evidence on the implications of tax avoidance for firm value. The general consensus from prior literature is that increased opportunities for rent extraction associated with tax avoidance, 1 for example in low governance firms, might offset the increase in the after-tax value of the firm. This literature examines the impact of tax avoidance on firm value by focusing on Tobin's q or stock price reactions. However, fundamental characteristics of the firm are key determinants of firm value (e.g., Feltham and Ohlson [1995] , Abarbanell and Bushee [1997] ). The accounting literature has largely ignored the effect of tax avoidance on fundamental characteristics of firms.
We investigate the association among tax avoidance and future firm fundamentals. More specifically, to better understand the mechanisms underlying the association between tax avoidance and firm value, as well to shed light on the mixed evidence in the prior literature, we examine how tax avoidance affects future firm fundamentals -profitability, asset utilization, and the leverage effects. 3 Further, we also investigate the influence of certain cross-sectional firm characteristics that can affect the ability of management to extract rents (these include foreign operations and governance structures) on the association between tax avoidance and firm fundamentals.
Tax avoidance activities increase after-tax cash flows, net assets, and financial slack of a firm; the average tax shelter transaction generates federal tax savings between $206 and $376 million (Wilson [2009] ; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt [2013] ). Desai and Dharmapala [2009] discuss two alternative perspectives on the motivations and effects of corporate tax avoidance. First, they 1 Rent extraction refers to non-value maximizing activities pursued by the management at the expense of the shareholders/owners, including perk consumption, aggressive financial reporting, and related party transactions (Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin [2010] ). 2 For example, Desai and Dharmapala [2009] , Hanlon and Slemrod [2009] , Wilson [2009] , Koester [2011] , Blaylock [2012] , DeSimone and Stomberg [2012] . 3 We examine two types of leverage effects in this study, the effects of operating liability leverage (OLLEV_FX) and financial leverage (FLEV_FX) . Nissim and Penman [2003] find that operating liabilities (i.e., accounts payable, deferred revenue) have different implications for future accounting rates of return than financial liabilities (i.e., debt); thus, the market prices the two types of leverage differently.
treat corporate tax avoidance as a substitute for other tax favored activity, like corporate borrowing (e.g., Graham and Tucker [2006] ). An alternative approach focuses on the agency perspective of tax avoidance, where tax avoidance enables and masks rent extraction through the use of complex and opaque structures. Therefore, ex-ante it is not obvious whether tax avoidance will be associated with an improvement in firm fundamentals. Desai and Dharmapala [2009] , Hanlon and Slemrod [2009] , Wilson [2009] , and Koester [2011] find evidence that investors value varying degrees of tax avoidance positively, but only in well-governed firms. 4 Therefore, we complement our analysis by examining whether the association between tax avoidance and firm fundamentals varies in different contexts that mitigate or exacerbate rent extraction. Specifically, we use the presence of foreign operations and governance structure to test for differences in the association between tax avoidance and future firm fundamentals in the cross-section.
We use DuPont analysis to study the relationships between tax avoidance and future firm fundamentals. DuPont analysis decomposes return on common equity into return on net operating assets and the financial leverage effect, and further decomposes the return on net operating assets into net operating profit margin, net operating asset turnover, and the operating liability leverage effect (Nissim and Penman [2001] , [2003] ). Net operating profit margin and net operating asset turnover measure different aspects of a firm's operations -pricing power and cost cutting drive the operating margin, and asset turnover reflects efficient asset utilization (e.g., Nissim and Penman [2001] ; Soliman [2008] ). 5 We conduct our analysis on a sample of 75,543 firm-year observations from 1970-2012. We measure tax avoidance as the quintile rank of the difference between a firm's five-year statutory tax rate (STR) and five-year effective tax rate (ETR). Overall, the association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return (pretax return on common equity [PTROCE] , pretax return on net 4 In contrast, Blaylock [2012] fails to find evidence of an association between tax avoidance and managerial rent extraction for a sample of U.S. firms. 5 In our analysis, we estimate our measures of operating profitability and its components on a pretax basis to control for the direct effect of reduced taxes on profits as a result of tax avoidance activities.
operating assets [PTRNOA] , and pretax return on operating assets [PTROOA] ) is negative. 6 When we decompose PTROCE, we find a positive association between tax avoidance and the future financial leverage effect (FLEV_FX) but a (much larger) negative association between tax avoidance and future pretax return on net operating assets (PTRNOA); these effects persist for periods up to five-years ahead. When we decompose PTRNOA, we find a persistent, negative association between both tax avoidance and the future operating liability leverage effect (OLLEV_FX) and tax avoidance and future pretax return on operating assets (PTROOA). Tax avoiding firms utilize financial (operating liability) leverage better (worse) than firms with less tax avoidance, therefore, the negative association between tax avoidance and PTROCE is smaller than the negative association between tax avoidance and PTRNOA, while the negative association between tax avoidance and PTRNOA is larger than the negative association between tax avoidance and PTROOA.
Upon further decomposition of PTRNOA, we find a positive association between tax avoidance and future pretax net operating profit margins (PTNOPM) and a (much larger) negative association between tax avoidance and future net operating assets utilization (NOAT), which leads to the negative association between tax avoidance and future PTRNOA. In summary, our evidence suggests that poor asset utilization and operating liability utilization (not lower operating profitability) drives the negative association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return.
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In the tax literature, Lev and Nissim [2004] find that the ratio of taxable income to book income predicts earnings growth, while a number of studies (e.g., Hanlon [2005] ; Ayers, Jiang, and LaPlante [2009] ; Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson [2012] ) document that differences between book and tax incomes (a proxy for tax avoidance) provide information to market participants about earnings 6 Pretax return on operating assets (PTROOA) is an accounting rate of return that reflects operating profitability in the absence of all leverage effects (i.e., the effects of both operating liabilities (OLLEV_FX) and financial liabilities (FLEV_FX). As we show later in the paper, PTROOA + OLLEV_FX = PTRNOA, while PTRNOA + FLEV_FX = PTROCE.
Anecdotal evidence is consistent with the negative association between tax avoidance and operating asset utilization (i.e., NOAT). IBM recently reduced its tax rate to a two-decade low as assets increased and revenue declined for seven straight quarters (Barinka and Drucker [2014] ). From 2011-2013, IBM's net operating profit margins (NOPM) remained relatively flat at 20 percent, NOAT decreased from 4.46 to 2.91, and the operating liability leverage ratio dropped from 2.55 to 1.74. quality. 8 Our results suggest that the lower persistence of accounting rates of return in tax avoiding firms is due to relatively poor balance sheet management (i.e., utilization of operating assets and operating liabilities), rather than earnings quality.
The results of our cross-sectional analyses are similar to those of our primary analysis reported above, regardless of the scope of foreign operations or the level of firm-specific governance.
We find that tax avoidance unambiguously lowers future pretax accounting rates of return (PTROCE, PTRNOA, and PTROOA), even in firms with foreign operations or good governance. Among tax avoiding firms, firms with foreign operations (good governance) have better future PTROOA and PTRNOA than corresponding domestic firms (poorly governed firms). However, domestic (poorly governed) firms use financial leverage more effectively than their multinational (good governance) counterparts, such that the future PTROCE of firms with foreign operations (good governance) is worse than (similar to) the future PTROCE of domestic (poorly governed) firms. In contrast, prior studies suggest that tax avoidance can increase firm value when opportunities to extract rents are relatively limited (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala [2009] ).
Our primary contribution to the literature is a comprehensive analysis of the association between tax avoidance and future performance. Unlike prior research that uses stock prices and returns to measure performance (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala [2009] , Hanlon and Slemrod [2009]; Wilson [2009] , Koester [2011] ), we provide direct evidence of the association between tax avoidance and future performance by focusing on how tax avoidance affects future earnings and its components; these are primary inputs in equity valuation (e.g., Feltham and Ohlson [1995] , Abarbanell and Bushee [1997] ). Our analysis is also consistent with the view that an important objective of accounting research is to discover how firm choices and financial statement information affect future earnings (Penman [1992] ). 8 Hanlon [2005] shows that firms with large temporary book-tax differences, which result in deferred taxes, have less persistent earnings (i.e., return on assets). Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson [2012] show that the source of temporary book-tax differences affects the implications of those differences; book-tax differences related to tax avoidance (earnings management) exhibit greater (lower) accruals and earnings persistence.
Second, many studies investigate the characteristics of profitability and demonstrate that understanding the evolution of profitability improves the predictability of earnings (Freeman, Ohlson and Penman [1982] ; Fairfield, Sweeney, and Yohn [1996] ; Fairfield and Yohn [2001] ; Nissim and Penman [2003] ; Penman and Zhang [2006] ). Graham, Raedy, and Shackelford [2012, p. 425] note that room remains for future research on the association between book-tax differences and earnings characteristics. We answer Graham et al. [2012] 's call and build on the prior literature that examines tax avoidance and earnings characteristics by examining the association between tax avoidance and DuPont measures of financial performance. Specifically, we examine the effects of tax avoidance on pretax ROCE and its components (RNOA, NOPM, NOAT, OLLEV_FX and FLEV_FX) and document that the negative association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return is largely due to inefficient utilization of operating assets and operating liabilities.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTION DEVELOPMENT Tax Avoidance and Firm Value
Tax avoidance activities increase the after-tax cash flows, net assets, and financial slack of a firm. Graham and Tucker [2006] find that for their sample of 44 tax shelter cases, the average tax shelter generates an annual tax deduction sufficient to shield income equal to approximately nine percent of asset value. Wilson [2009] and Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt [2013] find that the average tax shelter transaction generates federal income tax savings of $206 to $376 million.
However, tax avoidance is costly; firms incur implementation costs, reputational costs, and agency costs such as rent extraction as tax avoidance increases. Recent research focuses on the agency perspective of tax avoidance, where tax avoidance enables and masks rent extraction through the use of complex and opaque structures (Chen et al. [2010] ; Balakrishnan et al. [2011] ; and Desai and Dharmapala [2006] ; [2009] ).
Despite the significant tax savings generated by tax avoidance activities, there is mixed evidence on the implications of tax avoidance for firm value; these effects vary in the cross-section. Desai and Dharmapala [2009] Desai, Dyck, and Zingales [2007] propose that for a given tax rate, an increase in tax enforcement can increase the market value of a firm by reducing the rent extraction of controlling shareholders. Consistent with their hypothesis, they find that the market values of Russian firms targeted by enforcement actions increased and the voting premium for their stocks decreased following an increase in tax enforcement. Frischmann, Shevlin, and Wilson [2008] and Robinson and Schmidt [2013] document positive returns to the first disclosures of uncertain tax benefits under FIN 48. Robinson and Schmidt [2013] further find that disclosure quality moderates the positive association between returns and uncertain tax benefits; investors value tax avoidance positively when managers mask the tax avoidance through poor disclosure. Hanlon and Slemrod [2009] find that the market reacts negatively to press accounts of tax shelter participation. However, the reaction varies in the cross-section; the negative abnormal returns to firms in the retail sector are significant and significantly different from the returns of non-retail firms, while the returns of firms with cash ETRs below the sample median are negative and significant and significantly less than the returns of firms with cash ETRs above the median. Similar to Dharmapala [2009], Wilson [2009] , and Koester [2011] , Hanlon and Slemrod [2009] find that investors value tax avoidance positively in firms with good governance, firms that have high ETRs, and firms that are not in the retail sector.
DuPont Analysis
The above-mentioned studies that investigate the effect of tax avoidance on firm value focus on Tobin's q or stock price reactions. Therefore, these studies provide indirect evidence of the 9 DeSimone and Stomberg [2012] characterize income mobile firms generally as those firms that have long-term, sustainable tax strategies that result from organizing global business operations in a tax efficient manner. Income mobile firms include multinational firms in high-tech industries with high profit margins and large amounts of R&D and advertising (DeSimone and Stromberg [2012] ). association between tax avoidance and future performance (Bernard [1993] ). Hence, we still do not fully understand the fundamental drivers of the association between tax avoidance and firm value.
We attempt to fill this void.
Expectations about current and future profitability are a primary input in equity valuation (Feltham and Ohlson [1995] ; Ohlson [1995] ; Nissim and Penman [2001] ). Beaver [1998] provides a theoretical link between earnings and firm value by arguing that current earnings and profitability provide information to predict future earnings. Consistent with this idea, several studies investigate the association between future stock returns and current earnings and/or other financial statement information. Lipe [1986] and Kormendi and Lipe [1987] document that transitory earnings components have a smaller association with stock returns. Ou and Penman [1989] , Lev and Thiagarajan [1993] , and Abarbanell and Bushee [1997] use financial ratios to estimate the "future earnings power" of firms and estimate the association between accounting information and future stock returns.
Studies in the tax literature document that the ratio of taxable income to book income predicts earnings growth (Lev and Nissim [2004] ; Weber [2009] ), and that differences between book and tax incomes (a proxy for tax avoidance) provide information to market participants and are informative about earnings quality (e.g., Philips, Pincus, and Rego [2003] ; Hanlon [2005] ; Hanlon, LaPlante, and Shevlin [2005] ; Ayers, Jiang, and LaPlante [2009] ; Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson [2012] ). Philips, Pincus, and Rego [2003] show that deferred taxes are a proxy for discretionary accruals and Hanlon [2005] shows that firms with large temporary book-tax differences, which result in deferred taxes, have less persistent earnings (i.e., return on assets). Blaylock, Shevlin, and Wilson [2012] show that the source of temporary book-tax differences affects the implications of those differences; book-tax differences related to tax avoidance (earnings management) exhibit greater (lower) accruals and earnings persistence.
To better understand the mechanisms underlying the association between tax avoidance and firm value, we examine the implications of tax avoidance for future performance using DuPont analysis. The standard DuPont analysis decomposes return on equity into three components, profit margin, asset turnover, and leverage. We use a modified DuPont decomposition introduced in Nissim and Penman [2001] ; [2003] . The Nissim and Penman [2001] ; [2003] DuPont decomposition provides for a clean distinction between the effects of operating and financing activities, which translates into accounting rates of return that clearly distinguish the effects of operating profit margins, operating asset utilization, operating liability leverage, and financial leverage. This decomposition allows us to provide additional insight on the source of the tax avoidance/earnings quality association.
Ceteris paribus, to the extent firms re-invest savings from tax avoidance activities in positive net present value projects that enhance firm value; we expect a positive association between tax avoidance and future performance components. However, if firms re-invest savings in negative net present value projects or divert the excess cash towards perquisite consumption that destroys firm value, we expect a negative association between tax avoidance and future performance components.
10
Thus, on average, the direction of the association between tax avoidance and future performance (and its components) is not obvious. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is as follows (we state all hypotheses in the null):
Tax avoidance is not associated with future performance. H 1B : Tax avoidance is not associated with future performance components.
Contextual Analysis of Performance and Tax Avoidance
The Effect of Foreign Operations
We first examine how the existence of foreign operations affects the association between tax avoidance and future performance components. A number of studies find a positive association between tax avoidance and the extent of foreign operations (Gupta and Newberry [1997] Lisowsky et al. [2013] ). One way firms with foreign operations reduce their tax burden is to shift income and expenses between high-and low-tax jurisdictions. For example, in 2010, news articles revealed how Google used complex tax planning 10 Our hypothesis implies that managers re-invest or divert tax benefits into activities that affect future pretax earnings. Therefore, we examine pretax profitability components in all of our regression models. strategies like the "Dutch Sandwich" and the "Double Irish" to reduce its overseas tax rate to 2.4% (see Drucker [2010] for a detailed description of these tax planning strategies). These incomeshifting strategies moved most of Google's profits through Ireland and the Netherlands to Bermuda.
Further, U.S. GAAP permits U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) to defer taxes on the earnings of foreign subsidiaries. The U.S. tax law creates incentives for U.S. MNCs to avoid the repatriation of foreign earnings and hold greater amounts of cash abroad by designating foreign earnings as permanently reinvested (PRE) (Krull [2004] ; Foley et al. [2007] ; Blouin, Krull, and Robinson [2012] ).
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However, research shows that excess cash holdings exacerbate agency costs; managers use the excess cash to enhance their own power and/or wealth (Jensen [1986]; Harford [1999] ). Edwards, Kravet, and Wilson [2012] examine the potential agency costs for firms with PRE and find that firms with high levels of PRE held as cash are more likely to make value-destroying foreign acquisitions using cash.
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To the extent foreign operations aid managerial rent extraction of the savings from tax avoidance, we should not document a positive association between future performance and tax avoidance. Accordingly, we investigate whether the association between tax avoidance and future performance varies for domestic and foreign firms.
The association between tax avoidance and future performance components does not differ between firms with and without foreign operations.
Governance Structure
Several recent empirical studies examine the association between governance and tax avoidance. Desai and Dharmapala [2006] find that equity compensation aligns managerial interests and reduces managers' incentives to invest in tax strategies that facilitate rent extraction. However, the negative association between equity compensation and tax avoidance only holds when firms have weak governance. Desai and Dharmapala [2009] The FASB prescribes the accounting treatment for taxes on foreign earnings under Accounting Standard Codification section 740 (ASC 740). Under ASC 740, the designation of foreign earnings as PRE allows U.S. MNCs to defer the recognition of the U.S. tax expense related to foreign earnings. 12 Edwards et al. [2012] hand collect the data on PRE from 10-K filings for their sample of 284 observations, which is relatively small compared to ours. Our initial sample comprises of 75,543 firm-year observations. Instead of hand collecting the information on PRE for our much larger sample, we use foreign operations to proxy for the option of designating foreign earnings as PRE to be tax aggressive.
positive association between firm value and tax avoidance, but only for firms with high institutional ownership. This suggests that shareholders value tax avoidance only when there are constraints on managerial rent diversion. In contrast, Blaylock [2012] documents a positive association between future performance and tax avoidance, even among poorly governed firms. Since corporate governance structure can affect rent extraction and the likelihood that firms channel savings from tax avoidance into positive NPV projects, we investigate whether the association between tax avoidance and future profitability varies based on firm-specific governance structures.
The association between tax avoidance and future performance components does not differ between firms with good and poor governance structures.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN Sample Selection
Our sample consists of 75,543 firm-year observations with available COMPUSTAT data for the years 1970 through 2012.
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We restrict our sample to include U.S.-based domestic and multinational firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX exchanges with common equity in excess of $10 million (in 2012 dollars), positive net operating assets, and at least five consecutive years of positive pretax income, cash taxes paid, and positive income tax expense. We further exclude utilities (SIC 4900-4950) and a broad array of financial institutions (SIC codes 6000-6999).
Measures of Corporate Tax Avoidance
In our reported analysis, we use the industry/year quintile rank of the difference between a firm's five-year statutory tax rate (SETR5) and five-year effective tax rate (BETR5) as our measure of tax avoidance (TAX_AVD).
14 We define BETR5 as total tax expense summed over five years, scaled by pretax income, summed over five years.
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This measure of tax avoidance conveys a firm's 13
In order to ensure that the results of our tests are not driven by changes in the corporate tax rate and/or differences in the accounting for income taxes, we also perform all of our tests on a sample that begins in 1994 (the FASB adopted SFAS 109 in 1993 and Congress changed the corporate income tax rate to 35 percent in 1993). All of our inferences are qualitatively similar when we use this alternative sample. 14 We also use five-year cash ETRs in our definition of tax avoidance (in place of book ETRs). Our results are qualitatively similar using this alternative measure of tax avoidance.
average tax cost per dollar of pretax income and captures a broad range of tax planning activities that have both certain and uncertain outcomes with tax authorities. We use the quintile rank of TAX_AVD instead of its actual value to mitigate potential measurement error and make the interpretation of the regression coefficient easier (Patatoukos [2012] ).
Using DuPont Analysis to Investigate the Effect of Tax Avoidance on Future Performance
To investigate whether tax avoidance affects a firm's future performance, we follow Nissim and Penman [2001] ; [2003] and decompose the return on common equity into its main components: profit margins, asset turnover, and the financial leverage effect. Specifically, we follow equation (4) in Nissim and Penman [2001] to decompose ROCE into its components:
where ROCE is return on common equity, defined as net income at the end of year t, deflated by common equity at the end of year t-1; RNOA is return on net operating assets, defined as operating income after tax at the end of year t (net income before net financial expenses after taxes) divided by net operating assets (operating assets minus operating liabilities) at the end of year t-1; FLEV is financial leverage, defined as financial obligations (i.e., short-and long-term debt) minus financial assets (i.e., cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities) at the end of year t-1 divided by common equity at the end of year t-1; and Net Borrowing Cost is net financial expense at the end of year t, divided by net financial obligations at the end of year t-1. The difference between RNOA and Net Borrowing Cost (i.e., the financial spread [FL_SPRD] ) multiplied by FLEV captures the financial leverage effect (FLEV_FX) on ROCE.
Nissim and Penman [2003] specify a type of financial statement analysis that distinguishes leverage that arises in financing activities from leverage that arises in operating activities. This type of analysis produces two leveraging equations, one for borrowing to finance operations (i.e., longterm debt) and one for borrowing that arises in the normal course of operations (i.e., accounts payable and deferred revenue). Nissim and Penman [2003] predict and find that investors price operating liabilities and financing liabilities differently; operating liabilities typically levers profitability more than financing liabilities and firms with higher operating liability leverage have higher price-to-book ratios. Therefore, we further decompose RNOA to isolate the effects of operating liabilities on performance.
We define RNOA above. ROOA is return on operating assets, defined as operating income after tax plus the implicit interest on operating liabilities 16 at the end of year t (net income before net financial expenses after taxes) divided by operating assets at the end of year t-1; OLLEV is operating liability leverage, defined as operating liabilities at the end of year t-1 divided by net operating assets at the end of year t-1; and Market Borrowing Rate is the after-tax one year risk-free interest rate at the end of year t-1. The difference between ROOA and Market Borrowing Rate (i.e., the operating liability leverage spread [OL_SPRD] ) multiplied by OLLEV captures the operating liability leverage effect (OLLEV_FX) on RNOA.
In addition to decomposing ROCE and RNOA to identify the effects of leverage, we follow Nissim and Penman [2001] ; [2003] , and also decompose RNOA into its DuPont components, profit margin and asset utilization:
where NOPM is net operating profit margin, defined as operating income after tax at the end of year t, divided by sales at the end of year t; and NOAT is net operating asset turnover, defined as sales at end of year t divided by net operating assets at the end of the year t-1. NOPM provides insights about the sensitivity of operating income to product price and cost structure and is often the result of a firm's pricing power. NOAT is a measure of asset utilization and captures the firm's efficiency in employing operating assets to generate sales.
When we implement our financial statement analysis model empirically, we estimate all of the ratios on a pretax basis to control for the direct effect of reduced taxes on profits as a result of tax 16 The numerator of ROOA adjusts operating income for the full implicit cost of trade credit.
avoidance activities. To investigate the association between tax avoidance and future performance, we estimate the following equations (suppressing firm subscripts):
The dependent variables, PTROCE, PTRNOA, and PTROOA represent the one-, three-, and five-year ahead pretax return on common equity, return on net operating assets, and return on operating assets, respectively. To investigate the association between tax avoidance and the specific components of future performance, we replace the dependent variables in equations (4) - (6) with the following future performance components: the financial leverage effect (FLEV_FXt+  ), the operating liability leverage effect (OLLEV_FXt+  ), pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPMt+  ), and net operating asset turnover (NOATt+  ). TAX_AVD is the industry/year quintile rank of the difference between a firm's five-year statutory tax rate (SETR5) and five-year effective tax rate (BETR5). We include a number of control variables that are correlated with tax avoidance and various measures of future firm performance. SIZE is the natural log of total assets (Watts and Zimmerman [1983] ), MB is the market-to-book ratio (Lev and Nissim [2004] ), ACC_QUAL is accruals quality, defined consistent with Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper [2005] , and EARN_VOLATILITY is the volatility of pretax income, defined as the standard deviation of pretax income from t-1 to t-3 (Dichev and Tang [2008] ). We report detailed variable definitions in Appendix A. Finally, we winsorize all continuous independent variables at 1% and 99% of their respective distributions and include year (YEAR) and industry (INDUSTRY) fixed-effects to control for fundamental differences in tax avoidance that may exist across years and industries. We report t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-consistent clustered (by firm) standard errors.
Cross-Sectional Tests of the Association between Tax Avoidance and Future Performance
In order to gain a better understanding of the association between tax avoidance and firm fundamentals, we examine two specific characteristics (scope of operations and governance) to help us analyze whether the association between tax avoidance and firm fundamentals varies in different contexts that mitigate or exacerbate rent extraction. We partition our sample based on each of these firm characteristics and conduct our analysis separately for each group of firms (e.g. domestic versus multinational firms, high governance versus low governance firms) and compare and contrast the results for both groups of firms.
We examine the effect of the scope of a firm's operations by comparing domestic and multinational firms. We classify a firm as multinational (FOPS = 1) if the firm reports non-zero foreign pretax income, non-zero current foreign tax expense, or non-zero deferred foreign tax expense. Otherwise, we classify a firm as domestic (FOPS = 0). We define governance consistent with Desai and Dharmapala [2006] ; [2009] , based on the percentage of outstanding common stock owned by institutional shareholders. We classify observations equal to or above (below) the median of the industry/year institutional ownership distribution as firms with good (poor) governance firms (i.e., [GGOV = 1 (GGOV = 0)]).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
We present descriptive statistics in Table 1. For Table 1 only, we classify observations in the top quintile of TAX_AVD as tax avoiders (TAX_AVD = 1) and firms in the bottom four quintiles of TAX_AVD as firms that are not tax avoiders (TAX_AVD = 0). By construction, BETR5, the five-year book ETR, is significantly lower for our sample of tax avoiding firms (we classify a firm as a tax avoider if TAX_AVD falls in the highest quintile each TAX_AVD industry/year distribution) as compared to firms that are not tax avoiders (mean of 0.209 vs. 0.442, respectively). 
The Association between Tax Avoidance and Pretax Accounting Rates of Return
We begin our multivariate analyses by examining the association between tax avoidance and various measures of future performance. We present the results of equations (4) - (6) in Table 2 , in which we use PTROCE, PTRNOA, and PTROOA as our performance measures. The coefficients on TAX_AVD are significantly negative for the one-, three-, and five-year ahead PTROCE, PTRNOA, and PTROOA models. After controlling for other firm characteristics and industry membership, there is an unambiguous negative association between tax avoidance and future performance. The coefficient magnitudes suggest an economically important spread across firms with different levels of tax avoidance. For the one-year ahead performance measures, the spread is 3.6 percent in terms of pretax return on common equity, 4.0 percent in terms of return on net operating assets, and 2.4 percent in terms of return on operating assets. We calculate the rate of return differential as the product of the TAX_AVD coefficient and the difference between the values of TAX_AVD for the top and bottom quintile (e.g., -0.009*[5-1] in the PTROCE regression). The coefficients on TAX_AVD are fairly stable three and five years into the future, which suggest that tax-avoiding firms 17 We focus the leverage discussion on the leverage effect -the amount of ROCE (RNOA) generated by the use of financial (operating liability) leverage, instead of a leverage ratio, which is a measure of the amount of liabilities a firm has in its capital structure. We measure the financial leverage effect (FLEV_FX) as PTROCE -PTRNOA and the operating liability leverage effect (OLLEV_FX) as PTRNOA -PTROOA. earn lower accounting rates of return (relative to firms with less tax avoidance) well into the future.
The one-year ahead results are broadly consistent with the results in Hanlon [2005] , who finds that pretax return on assets declines as temporary book-tax differences increase. However, Hanlon [2005] suggests that her results reflect earnings quality; the persistence of the PTROCE, PTRNOA, and PTROOA coefficients into the future suggests that firms engage in tax avoidance activities (in part) to mask poor pretax operating performance.
[PLACE To understand why firms with greater tax avoidance have lower accounting rates of return, we decompose pretax return on net operating assets to identify the effects of tax avoidance on future operating profit margin and net operating asset turnover. In Panel A of Table 3 , we present the results of estimating regressions of future (one-three-and five-years ahead) PTRNOA components.
Specifically, we focus on the pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPM) and the net operating asset turnover (NOAT). In columns [1]-[3] of Panel A in Table 3 , the coefficients on TAX_AVD are significantly positive in each PTNOPM regression. The one-, three-, and five-year ahead net operating profit margin of tax avoiding firms is 1.6 percent, 1.2 percent, and 0.8 percent, respectively, higher than the corresponding net operating profit margin of firms that are not tax avoiders.
We examine the association among tax avoidance and future net operating asset turnover in Table 3 . The coefficients on TAX_AVD are significantly negative in each NOAT regression; the one-, three-, and five-year ahead net operating asset turnover of tax avoiding firms is 50.0 percent, 45.6 percent, and 47.2 percent, respectively, lower than the corresponding net operating asset turnover of firms that are not tax avoiders. The negative association between TAX_AVD and NOAT is larger than the positive association between TAX_AVD and PTNOPM, which explains the overall negative association between tax avoidance and pretax return on net operating assets that we document in columns [4]-[6] in Table 2 . Therefore, the negative association between tax avoidance and return on net operating assets is primarily due to inefficient asset utilization instead of the profitability operations. This suggests that poor balance sheet management is responsible for the negative association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return.
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Decompositions of Pretax ROCE and RNOA: The Effect of Financial Leverage and Operating Liability Leverage
To further understand why firms with greater tax avoidance have lower accounting rates of return, we decompose pretax return on common equity and pretax return on net operating assets to identify the effects of tax avoidance on future financial leverage and operating liability leverage. In Table 2 ).
We next examine the future operating liability leverage effect of firms with different degrees of tax avoidance. The coefficients on TAX_AVD are significantly negative in each OLLEV_FX regression; the one-, three-, and five-year ahead operating liability leverage effect of tax avoiding firms are all 1.6 percent, lower than the corresponding operating liability leverage effects of firms that are not tax avoiders. The negative operating liability leverage effect explains why the negative association between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA (presented in columns [4]-[6] of Table 2 ) is larger than the negative association between TAX_AVD and PTROOA (presented in columns [7] -[9] of Table 2 ).
These results provide further evidence that poor balance sheet management is responsible for the negative association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return.
[PLACE TABLE 3 HERE]
Cross-Sectional Tests of the Effect of Tax Avoidance on Future Profitability
Existence of Foreign Operations
We present the results of tests that examine how tax avoidance affects various summary measures of future performance (PTROOA, PTRNOA, and PTROCE) of multinational versus domestic firms in Panels A, C, and E, respectively, of Table 4 . We report the one-, three-, and five- Table 4 . In the PTROOA, PTRNOA, and PTROCE regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD are negative and significant, regardless of the performance measure or the scope of firm operations (multinational or domestic). In addition, the negative associations are largely stable; the negative effects of tax avoidance manifest early and persist for at least five years. We next examine specific ratio components to provide insights on the source of these negative associations. Table 4 show how tax avoidance affects the use of operating liability leverage by multinational and domestic firms. The operating liability leverage effect (OLLEV_FX) explains how firms lever up pretax return on net operating assets (PTRNOA) relative to PTROOA. In the OLLEV_FX regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD are negative and significant; tax avoiding multinational and domestic firms have lower future OLLEV_FX than their counterparts that avoid fewer taxes. However, there is no difference in the association between TAX_AVD and OLLEV_FX for multinational and domestic firms until five years ahead; the association between TAX_AVD and five-year ahead OLLEV_FX for multinational firms is significantly different from the association between TAX_AVD and five-year ahead OLLEV_FX for domestic firms (1 and PTRNOA will be more negative than the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA.
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Decompositions of Pretax
We examine the association between TAX_AVD and pretax return on net operating assets (PTRNOA) in Panel C of Table 4 . The coefficients on TAX_AVD are all negative and significant and are more negative than the coefficients on TAX_AVD from the PTROOA regressions. Similar to the results we reported on the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA in Panel A, we find that the negative association between TAX_AVD and one-year ahead PTRNOA is significantly smaller for multinational firms relative to domestic firms (2 PTRNOA = 9.56, p <= 0.05), while there is no difference in the association between TAX_AVD and three-year ahead PTRNOA of multinational and domestic firms. However, the association between TAX_AVD and five-year ahead PTRNOA for multinational firms is significantly different from the association between TAX_AVD and five-year ahead PTRNOA for domestic firms (1 FOPS = 1 = -0.012 < 1 FOPS = 0 = -0.009, 2 = 3.81, p <= 0.05). As we discussed in the previous paragraph, this deterioration in performance, relative to PTROOA, is due to the inefficient use of operating liabilities.
The results in in Panel D of Table 4 document how tax avoidance affects the use of financial leverage by multinational and domestic firms. The financial leverage effect (FLEV_FX) explains how firms lever up pretax return on common equity (PTROCE) relative to PTRNOA. In the FLEV_FX regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD for domestic firms are positive and significant, while the coefficients on TAX_AVD for multinational firms are generally not different from zero. Tax avoiding domestic firms use financial leverage more effectively than tax avoiding multinational firms; the difference in the coefficients on TAX_AVD between domestic and multinational firms is highly significant in each future period. The lower FLEV_FX of multinationals relative to domestic firms is consistent with multinational firms holding more cash abroad by designating foreign earnings as permanently reinvested, which leads to a less than optimal leverage structure and a reduction in future performance.
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The positive (lack of) associations between TAX_AVD and FLEV_FX for domestic (multinational) firms suggest that the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROCE for domestic (multinational) firms will be less negative than (similar to) the corresponding associations between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA.
We examine the association between TAX_AVD and pretax return on common equity (PTROCE) in Panel E of Table 4 . The coefficients on TAX_AVD are all negative and significant and are in general more negative than the coefficients on TAX_AVD from the PTROOA regressions. In contrast to the results we reported on the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA (PTRNOA) in Panel A (C), we find that the negative association between TAX_AVD and one-year ahead PTROCE is significantly larger for multinational firms relative to domestic firms (1 
If we decompose FLEV_FX, and examine the effects of TAX_AVD on future financial leverage ratios (i.e., FLEV), we find that the coefficient on TAX_AVD for multinational firms is significantly lower than the coefficient on TAX_AVD for domestic firms in one-, three-, and five-year ahead regressions (all p <= 0.01). Further, unreported descriptive statistics indicate that multinational firms hold significantly more financial assets (FA) than domestic firms (mean (median) multinational FA = 515.52 (54.76); mean (median) domestic FA = 199.83 (11.30); t = 22.68, p = 0.000).
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Decompositions of Pretax RNOA: The Effect of Net
Operating Profit Margin and Net Operating Asset Turnover. The preceding discussion suggests that tax avoiding multinationals enjoy a short-term operating performance (PTROOA and PTRNOA) advantage over tax avoiding domestic firms, but this advantage dissipates over time. In order to better understand the evolution of PTRNOA, we separately examine the association of TAX_AVD and the two multiplicative components of PTRNOA, pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPM) and net operating asset turnover (NOAT). 19 We present the results of future PTNOPM (NOAT) regressions in Panel F (G) of Table 4 . In the PTNOPM regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD for domestic firms are positive and significant, while the coefficients on TAX_AVD for multinational firms are positive and significant only for one-year ahead PTNOPM (the coefficients on TAX_AVD for multinational firms in the three-and five-year ahead PTNOPM regressions are statistically indistinguishable from zero). In addition, the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the PTNOPM regressions for domestic firms are all significantly larger than the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the PTNOPM regressions for multinational firms.
However, the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the NOAT regressions are all negative and significant; tax-avoiding firms have lower asset turnovers than firms that use less tax avoidance. We find that the negative association between TAX_AVD and one-year ahead NOAT is significantly smaller for multinational firms relative to domestic firms (1 coefficients are many times greater than the magnitudes of the PTNOPM coefficients, which suggests that the negative association between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA (and PTROOA) is primarily due to inefficient asset utilization, rather than the profitability of sales.
[PLACE Our inferences are similar if we examine the two multiplicative components of PTROOA, pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPM) and operating asset turnover (OAT).
Governance Structure
We present the results of tests that examine how tax avoidance affects various summary measures of future performance (PTROOA, PTRNOA, and PTROCE) of firms with good and poor governance in Panels A, C, and E, respectively, of Table 5 . We classify observations above (below) the median of the industry/year institutional ownership distribution as having good (poor) governance. We report the one-, three-, and five-year ahead tax avoidance associations of firms with good (GGOV = 1) and poor (GGOV = 0) governance in columns Table 5 . Similar to all of the previous PTROOA, PTRNOA, and PTROCE regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD are negative and significant, regardless of the performance measure or the firm-specific governance structure (good or poor). In addition, the negative associations are largely stable; the negative effects of tax avoidance manifest early and persist for at least five years. Next, we examine specific ratio components to provide insights on the source of these negative associations for firms with good and poor governance. We use the data in Panel B of Table 5 to examine how tax avoidance affects the use of operating liability leverage by firms with good versus poor governance. In the OLLEV_FX regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD are negative and significant; tax-avoiding firms with good and poor governance have lower future OLLEV_FX than their counterparts that avoid fewer taxes. However, there is no difference in the association between TAX_AVD and OLLEV_FX for firm-years with different governance in any of the future periods. The negative associations between TAX_AVD and OLLEV_FX suggest that the associations between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA will be more negative than the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA.
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Decompositions of Pretax
We examine the association between TAX_AVD and pretax return on net operating assets (PTRNOA) of firms with good and poor governance in Panel C of Table 5 . The coefficients on TAX_AVD are all negative and significant and are more negative than the coefficients on TAX_AVD from the PTROOA regressions. Similar to the results we reported on the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA in Panel A, we find that the negative association between TAX_AVD and one-, three-, and five-year ahead PTRNOA is significantly smaller for firms with good governance relative to firms with poor governance (2 PTRNOA = 5.51, p <= 0.05, 2 PTRNOA = 5.11, p <= 0.05,2 PTRNOA = 2.71, p <= 0.10, respectively). As we discussed in the previous paragraph, this deterioration in performance, relative to PTROOA, is due to the inefficient use of operating liabilities.
We next use the data in Panel D of Table 5 to examine how tax avoidance affects the use of financial leverage by firms with good and poor governance. In the FLEV_FX regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD for poorly governed firms are positive, but only the three-year ahead TAX_AVD coefficient is significant. For firms with good governance, the TAX_AVD coefficient for one-year ahead FLEV_FX is negative and (marginally) significant, while the three-and five-year ahead TAX_AVD coefficients are positive, but statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, tax avoiding firms with poor governance use financial leverage more effectively than tax avoiding firms with good governance; the difference in the coefficients on TAX_AVD between firms with good and poor governance is highly significant one-and three-years ahead (2 FLEV_FX = 8.15, p <= 0.01, 2 FLEV_FX = 7.00, p <= 0.01, respectively). This is an unexpected result; however, the results of unreported regressions of TAX_AVD on future financial leverage (FLEV) indicate that poorly governed firms have significantly more net debt in their capital structure than firms with good governance. Given that tax-avoiding firms with poor governance use financial leverage more effectively than tax avoiding firms with good governance, we expect that the differences in the association between TAX_AVD and PTROCE for firms with good/poor governance will be smaller than the respective differences in the association between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA for these firms.
We examine the association between TAX_AVD and pretax return on common equity (PTROCE) of firms with good/poor governance in Panel E of Table 5 . Similar to the PTROOA (PTRNOA) regression results that we report in Panel A (C) of Table 5 , the coefficients on TAX_AVD are all negative and significant. In contrast to the results we reported on the associations between TAX_AVD and PTROOA (PTRNOA) in Panel A (C), we find no difference in the association between TAX_AVD and one-, three-, and five-year ahead PTROCE for firms with good and poor governance.
As we discussed in the previous paragraph, the difference in the association between TAX_AVD and future PTROCE for firms with good and poor governance is smaller than the corresponding difference in the association between TAX_AVD and future PTRNOA because tax avoiding poorly governed firms use financial leverage more effectively than tax avoiding firms with good governance.
Tax Avoidance and DuPont Decompositions of Pretax RNOA: The Effect of Net
Operating Profit Margin and Net Operating Asset Turnover. The preceding discussion suggests that tax-avoiding firms with good governance enjoy a short-term operating performance (PTROOA and PTRNOA) advantage over tax avoiding firms with poor governance. In order to better understand the evolution of PTRNOA for firms with good and poor governance, we separately examine the association of TAX_AVD and the two multiplicative components of PTRNOA, pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPM) and net operating asset turnover (NOAT). 20 We present the results of future PTNOPM (NOAT) regressions in Panel F (G) of Table 5 . In the PTNOPM regressions, all of the coefficients on TAX_AVD for firms with good governance are positive and significant, while the coefficients on TAX_AVD for firms with poor governance are statistically indistinguishable from zero. In addition, the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the PTNOPM regressions 20 Our inferences are similar if we examine the two multiplicative components of PTROOA, pretax net operating profit margin (PTNOPM) and operating asset turnover (OAT).
for firms with good governance are all significantly larger than the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the PTNOPM regressions for firms with poor governance.
However, the coefficients on TAX_AVD in the NOAT regressions are all negative and significant; tax-avoiding firms have lower asset turnovers than firms that use less tax avoidance. In addition, there is no difference in the association between TAX_AVD and the one-, three-or five-year ahead NOAT of firms with different governance structures. The magnitudes of the NOAT coefficients are many times greater than the magnitudes of the PTNOPM coefficients, which suggests that the negative association between TAX_AVD and PTRNOA (and PTROOA) is primarily due to inefficient asset utilization, rather than the profitability of sales.
[PLACE TABLE 5 HERE]
Discussion of Cross-Sectional Results
The results of the cross-sectional tests largely confirm our main results. Irrespective of the scope of operations or governance structure, there is an unambiguous negative association between tax avoidance and future accounting rates of return; this negative association is largely the result of poor operating asset and operating liability utilization that outweighs the benefits derived from operating profitability. The negative association between tax avoidance and PTROOA and PTRNOA is significantly smaller for multinational firms relative to domestic firms. However, these results reverse as we move from analyzing future PTRNOA to future PTROCE; the negative association between tax avoidance and PTROCE is significantly larger for multinational firms relative to domestic firms. This reversal is due to the ineffective use of financial leverage by multinational firms relative to domestic firms; multinational firms hold more cash abroad by designating foreign earnings as permanently reinvested, which leads to a less than optimal financial leverage structure and a reduction in future performance.
The results of the governance tests are largely similar to the results of the multinational/domestic firm tests. The negative association between tax avoidance and PTROOA and PTRNOA is significantly smaller for firms with good governance relative to poorly governed firms; tax-avoiding firms with good governance have better future pretax profit margins but similar asset turnovers than poorly governed tax avoiding firms. However, firms with poor governance make better use of future financial leverage such that we fail to find a difference in the association between tax avoidance and PTROCE for firms with good and poor governance.
Robustness Tests
Our tests examine the association between tax avoidance and various measures of firm performance. However, the decision to engage in transactions considered as tax avoidance is voluntary; therefore our sample could be systematically biased due to selection-related concerns.
Therefore, we should estimate some form of an endogenous treatment regression model (Heckman [1976 (Heckman [ , 1978 (Heckman [ , 1979 ; Maddala [1983] ; Wooldridge [2010] ) to control for the endogeneity of tax avoidance. Larker and Rusticus [2008] and Lennox, Francis, and Wang [2012] emphasize that selection models should include at least one exogenous exclusion restriction in order to successfully control for endogeneity.
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Models of the determinants of tax avoidance (e.g., Gupta and Newberry [1997] ; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew [2008] ; Hoopes, Mescall, and Pittman [2012] ), from which we would base our first-stage "selection" regression, almost exclusively include variables (e.g., size, leverage, inventory intensity, research and development intensity, capital expenditures, advertising intensity, SG&A intensity, and foreign income) that correlate with the primary outcome of interest in our second-stage regression, future performance. Therefore, we do not believe that it is feasible to identify an appropriate exogenous exclusion restriction that would allow us to implement a credible selection model. Lennox et al. [2012, p. 610] suggest that it is better science when authors admit to having difficulty identifying proper exclusion restrictions rather than make claims of having controlled for selection bias using an ad hoc specification of a selection model that corroborates any OLS findings. 21 An exclusion restriction occurs when at least one independent variable that is correlated with the dependent variable in the first-stage model is not correlated with the dependent variable in the second-stage model and is therefore excluded from the second-stage regression. If the variables in each stage of the regression model are the same, the identification in the second stage can be weak; the two-stage least squares approach can be unreliable and researchers should interpret the results with caution (Tucker [2010] ).
22 Lennox et al [2012] acknowledge that it is possible to estimate a selection model in the absence of an exogenous exclusion restriction because the inverse Mills ratio is nonlinear in its arguments. However, econometricians advise against using nonlinearities to identify selection bias because of potential model misspecification and multicollinearity.
Rather than use an ad hoc specification to try and address any selection related issues, we follow the suggestion in Lennox et al. [2012, p. 611] and re-estimate all of our regressions using panel data. As long as any of the unobservable factors that affect the choice of tax strategy remain constant during our sample period, we can control for them using a fixed effects panel data model.
23
When we estimate two-way (firm and year) fixed effects models in place of the OLS regressions, we find results that are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to the results that we present in Tables 2 -5 . In addition, we repeat the panel data tests using a shorter sample period (beginning in 1994 after the introduction of SFAS 109 and the change in corporate tax rates). All of our inferences are qualitatively similar when we use this alternative sample with the panel data estimator.
CONCLUSION
We study the association between tax avoidance and future performance. We use the DuPont framework to identify the components of future performance. We complement the DuPont analysis by examining whether there is cross-sectional variation in the association between tax avoidance and future performance. On average, there is an unambiguous negative association between tax avoidance and future performance; the negative association between tax avoidance and future performance is the result of poor operating asset and operating liability utilization and efficiency, not lower operating profitability. These results persist in various contexts that mitigate or exacerbate rent extraction, such as the existence of foreign operations and better governance structures.
Prior studies have used stock price related information to assess the impact of tax avoidance on firm value. Since prices and returns summarize shareholders' expectation about future performance of the firm, these studies provide indirect evidence of the effect of tax avoidance on future performance. Our paper contributes to the literature by providing direct evidence of the association between tax avoidance and future performance, allowing for a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms through which tax avoidance affects firm value. 
